

## HEIDEGGER'S ANALYSIS OF NIETZSCHE'S THOUGHTS ON ZARATHUSTRA

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His piece regarding this present undertaking is opened by Heidegger with a question: "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathura?"

If we solicit answers, or to the least, hints from Nietzsche himself, we have the following probable answer or statements about Zarathustra: "One day...other institutions will be needed in which people live and teach as I understand living and teaching: perhaps even chairs for the interpretation of Zarathustra will be established."<sup>1</sup> "When Doctor Heinrich von Stein once honestly complained that he understood not one word of my Zarathustra, I told him that was quite in order; to have understood, that is to say experienced, six sentences of that book would raise one to a higher level of mortals than 'modern' man could attain to."<sup>2</sup> "The word 'superman'...- a word which, in the mouth of a Zarathustra, the destroyer of morality, becomes a very thoughtful word – has almost everywhere been understood with perfect innocence in the sense of those values whose antithesis makes its appearance in the figure of Zarathustra: that is to say as an 'idealistic' type of higher species of man, half 'saint,' half 'genius'..."<sup>3</sup> "The style of Zarathustra is described and anticipated with incisive certainty; and one will find nowhere a more magnificent expression for the Zarathustra event, the act of a tremendous purification and dedication to mankind."<sup>4</sup> "I SHALL now tell the story of Zarathustra. The basic conception of the work, the idea of eternal recurrence, the highest formula of affirmation that can possibly be attained..."<sup>5</sup> "The whole of Zarathustra might perhaps be reckoned as music; - certainly a rebirth of the art of hearing was a pre-condition of it."<sup>6</sup> "...that the poets of the Veda are priests and not even worthy to unloose the latchet of the shoes of a Zarathustra..."<sup>7</sup> "Zarathustra has an eternal right to say; 'I form circles and holy boundaries around myself..."<sup>8</sup> "Reckoned into a single sum the spirit and goodness of all great souls: all of them together would not be capable of producing one of Zarathustra's discourses."<sup>9</sup> "He (Zarathustra) contradicts with every word, this most affirmative of all spirits; all opposites are in him bound together into a new unity. The highest and the lowest forces of human nature, the sweetest, most frivolous and fearsome stream forth out of one fountain with immortal certainty."<sup>10</sup> "The is no wisdom, no psychology, no art of speech before Zarathustra..."<sup>11</sup>

Further Nietzsche argues: "It is in precisely this compass of space, in this access to opposites that Zarathustra feels himself to be the highest species of all existing things..."<sup>12</sup> "In another place, he defines as strictly as possible what alone 'man' can be for him – not an object of love, not to speak of pity – Zarathustra has also mastered great disgust at man: to him man is formless, material, an ugly stone which requires the sculptor."<sup>13</sup> "...who could in the end divine what kind of recuperation is needed after such expenditure of goodness as Zarathustra is? Speaking theologically – pay heed, for I rarely speak as a theologian – it was God himself who at the end of his labour lay down as a serpent under the Tree of Knowledge: was thus he recuperated from being God... The Devil is merely the idleness of God on the seventh day..."<sup>14</sup> "Does one want a formula for a destiny that has become man?-and he who wants to be a creator in good and evil has first to be destroyer and break values. Thus, the greatest evil

belongs with the greatest good: This, however, is the creative good.”<sup>15</sup> “what the name Zarathustra means in precisely my mouth, in the mouth of the first immoralist... Zarathustra was the first to see in the struggle between good and evil the actual wheel in the working of things: the translation of morality into the realm of metaphysics, as a force, cause, end-in-itself, is his work...”<sup>16</sup>“Zarathustra created this most fateful of errors, morality: consequently he must also be first to recognize it.”<sup>17</sup>“...what is more important is that Zarathustra is more truthful than any other thinker. His teaching, and his alone, upholds truthfulness as the supreme virtue...”<sup>18</sup>“...Zarathustra has more courage in him than all other thinkers put together...The self-overcoming of morality through truthfulness, the self-overcoming of the moralist into his opposite – into –me that is what the name Zarathustra means in my mouth.”<sup>19</sup>“Zarathustra, the first to grasp that optimism is just as decadent as pessimism...you were born and kept on the lies of the good. Everything has been distorted and twisted down to its very bottom through the good... In this sense Zarathustra calls the good now ‘the last men’, now the ‘beginning of the end;’ above all he feels them to be the most harmful species of man, because they present their existence as much as at the expense of the future.”<sup>20</sup> “Zarathustra, the first psychologist of the good, is – consequently – a friend of the wicked... Zarathustra ... says that it was knowledge of precisely the good, the ‘best,’ which made him feel horror at, man in general...-he does not dissemble that it is precisely in relation to the good that his type of man, a relatively superhuman type, is superhuman, that the good and just would call his superman a devil...”<sup>21</sup>“...Zarathustra’s intentions are: the species of man he delineates reality as it is: he is strong enough for it – he is not estranged from or entranced by it, he is reality itself, he still has all that is fearful and questionable in reality in him, only thus can man possess greatness....”<sup>22</sup>

No, not only from Nietzsche himself can we gather ideas who Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is. His translator and critic, i.e., Walter Kaufmann, can also help shed light to us on how does he view Nietzsche’s celebrated book: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

In his Translator’s Preface of Nietzsche’s book *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Walter Kaufmann forwards his acidic comment. Says Kaufmann:

And the most important single clue to Zarathustra is that it is a work of an utterly lonely man.<sup>23</sup>

Kaufmann says further:

And what we find again and again in Zarathustra are the typical emotions with which a boy tries to compensate himself.<sup>24</sup>

Furthermore, Kaufmann holds:

To be sure, Zarathustra abounds in allusions to the Bible, most of them highly irreverent.<sup>25</sup>

In the above rancid comments, Kaufmann has deliberately reduced Nietzsche in his *Zarathustra* as an utterly lonely man who failed to detach himself from the coiled umbilical cord in his boyhood. This did not stop Kaufmann to observe that in Nietzsche’s utter

loneliness, he dared to compare himself with Christ. And this is being reinforced by Michael Tanner in his Introduction in Nietzsche's book *Ecce Homo*. Tanner eagerly unleashes his biting criticism to Nietzsche when he asserts that the latter's *Ecce Homo* is overflowing with high pitch of blasphemous banter. Writes Tanner:

*Ecce Homo* is the title of Friedrich Nietzsche's autobiography. Almost certainly, it is the most bizarre example of that genre ever penned. Its oddness begins with the title, which is a clear reference to St. John's Gospel, where it is narrated that Pilate brought Jesus out with his crown of thorns for the Jews to see, and said to them: 'Behold the man.' So Nietzsche is evidently comparing himself to Christ, and whether seriously or in jest, the comparison remains equally blasphemous.<sup>26</sup>

The foregoing quotations lifted from two of Nietzsche's prominent books, namely: *Ecce Homo* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* are undeniably the direct sources which Martin Heidegger must have based his own interpretation of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* To Heidegger *Zarathustra* is a speaker. And as speaker, "...Zarathustra is an 'advocate'..."<sup>27</sup> Heidegger cautiously remarks that: "The 'advocate' advocates and is the spokesman."<sup>28</sup> Through this, he clarifies that the terms "speaker" and "advocate" are synonymous.

So as an advocate, what does Zarathustra speak of, or as speaker, what does Zarathustra advocate?

In Heidegger's analysis, Zarathustra is an advocate of three teachings, viz.: (1) Advocate of life; (2) Advocate of suffering; and (3) Advocate of circle,<sup>29</sup> For Heidegger, "Zarathustra presents himself as the advocate of the fact that all being is Will to Power, which suffers as creative, colliding will and thus wills itself in the eternal recurrence of the same."<sup>30</sup> The statement seems to be Heidegger's way of keeping the meat in Zarathustra's vocation as an advocate.

Aside from taking Zarathustra as a speaker or as an advocate, Heidegger also notes that Zarathustra is a convalescent. To Heidegger:

The convalescent is the man who collects himself to return home – that is, to turn in, into his own destiny. The convalescent is on the road to Himself, so that he can say of himself who he is.<sup>31</sup>

As convalescent, Heidegger quotes Nietzsche of saying thus:

I, Zarathustra, the advocate of life, the advocate of suffering, the advocate of the circle....<sup>32</sup>

And Heidegger says further:

Zarathustra speaks on behalf of life, suffering, the circle, and this is what he advocates.<sup>33</sup>

But in the above quotation, Heidegger argues that life, suffering, circle are one and the same things.<sup>34</sup> In effect, Heidegger is confident that one is inclusive of the two others. This means that there is no lifeless suffering, just as there is no sufferingless life and that there is no circleless life and suffering.

After having established a clearing relative to the issues on “speaker,” “advocate.” And “convalescent” in relation to Zarathustra, Heidegger now positions himself to capture the depth of Nietzsche’s thoughts regarding the meaning of “life,” “suffering,” and “circle.” According to Heidegger:

...in Nietzsche’s language, ‘life’ means the will to power as the fundamental characteristic of all beings, not only of man.<sup>35</sup>

Further, Heidegger holds that for Nietzsche:

...suffering means: “All that suffers wills to live, i.e., everything whose way is the Will to Power.”<sup>36</sup>

Furthermore, Heidegger maintains that by circle, Nietzsche means:

the sign of the ring, which flows back into itself and so always achieves the recurring selfsameness.<sup>37</sup>

Finally, Heidegger is also quick to refuse that Zarathustra is only a speaker, an advocate and convalescent, because for him, as he sees Nietzsche, Zarathustra is also a teacher. Heidegger asserts:

...the advocate Zarathustra is a ‘teacher’. He seems to teach two things: the Eternal Recurrence of the same and the Superhuman.<sup>38</sup>

It is important now to raise the question noted by Heidegger: Did Zarathustra proclaim himself as a speaker, as an advocate, as a convalescent, and as a teacher? In Heidegger’s sharp observation, he notes that Zarathustra has neither imposed nor declared himself to be one (as a speaker, as an advocate, as a convalescent, and as a teacher). It is Zarathustra’s animals that have declared him, thus: “You are the teacher of Eternal Recurrence.”<sup>39</sup> Thus, “Zarathustra does not utter to himself. It is what his animals tell him” (that: You are the teacher of Eternal Recurrence).<sup>40</sup>

Zarathustra’s animal, namely: an eagle and a snake symbolize Nietzsche’s teachings on the essence of a circle and a ring. Heidegger writes:

And behold! An eagle soared through the air in wide circles and on him, there hang a snake, not like prey but like a friend: for she kept herself wound around his neck. In this mysterious embrace, we already have a presentiment of how circle and ring are implicitly entwined in the circling of the eagle and the winding of the snake.<sup>41</sup>

The importance of the role played by these animals of Zarathustra is that they support Zarathustra's doctrine on conformity to one's nature. "Fore the eagle and the snake never first compose a circle; rather, they conform to it, thus to obtain their own nature."<sup>42</sup> Hence, "Zarathustra's animals ascertain his nature."<sup>43</sup> In this vein, Heidegger says:

So Zarathustra's animals... tell him the following: 'For your animals know well Zarathustra, who you are and must become: behold you are the teacher of the eternal recurrence – that is your destiny!'"<sup>44</sup>

After having been assured by his animals regarding his nature and his "vocation" of being a teacher of Eternal Recurrence and of the Superman, Heidegger notes that Zarathustra is enveloped by horror; yet, ironically, this dark wind of horror gave Zarathustra more power to his wings, i.e., he becomes arrogant and ecstatic.<sup>45</sup> And here, Heidegger is quick to dispense his caveat:

Zarathustra is only the teacher, not yet the Superhuman himself. And ... Nietzsche is not Zarathustra, but the questioner who attempts in thought to grasp Zarathustra's nature.<sup>46</sup>

So, who is the Superman? In answer to this query, Heidegger holds:

Nietzsche does not give the name 'superman' to man such as [one who] exists until now only super – dimensional. Nor does he mean a type of man who tosses humanity aside and makes sheer caprice (of) the law, titanic rage the rule. Rather, taking the word quite literally, the Superman is the individual who surpasses man as he is up to now, for the purpose of bringing man-till-now into his still unattained nature, and there to secure him.<sup>47</sup>

In simple terms, Heidegger sees Nietzsche's Superman as a human being who "...surpasses previous and contemporary man, and is therefore a passage, a bridge."<sup>48</sup>

As a passage and a bridge, the Superman stands as the ideal direction or the "destination (that) must be kept in view – by us, first of all; by him who crosses over, and, above all, by the teacher who is to reveal it."<sup>49</sup> And Heidegger deliberately pierces through more sharper needles in one's destination towards the direction of Zarathustra. Says Heidegger:

To the person crossing over, and indeed to the teacher who is to show the bridge to Zarathustra himself, the destination always remains at a distance.<sup>50</sup>

Since the destination to be the Superman remains always at a distance, Heidegger opines that Nietzsche, through Zarathustra, challenges human beings to long towards that direction, that destination, i.e., to arrive at his authentic nature. Indeed, "Longing is the agony of the nearness of the distance (distant)."<sup>51</sup>

Thus:

The longing of the person crossing over is directed towards that to which he crosses. The person crossing over, and even the teacher who shows him the way, is ... on the way to his authentic nature. He is the convalescent.<sup>52</sup>

The journey towards the destination of the Superman id for Heidegger a trip that indispensably occurs in time. Time, for Heidegger, is not ostensible but something that serves as a condition sine qua non in one's foresight towards reaching this destination, i.e., to be the Superman.

And, it is the realm of time where Heidegger attempts to fathom the very depth of Nietzsche's inner thoughts on the Eternal Recurrence of the same. Undeniably, Nietzsche's usage of the terms "most abysmal thought" sounds awful. But Heidegger observes that what led Nietzsche used these terms is because he is a thinker who is at home of having a conversation to his soul, like what Plato did.<sup>53</sup> And as Zarathustra is "...in conversation with his soul, (he) thinks his most abysmal thought."<sup>54</sup>

So, what has time to do with the issue of Eternal Recurrence? To answer this question Heidegger quotes Nietzsche of saying:

O my soul. I taught you to say 'Today' and 'One Day' and 'Formerly'....<sup>55</sup>

To Heidegger, the terms "Today," "One Day," and "Formerly," "name the fundamental features of time."<sup>56</sup> In Heidegger's observation, these terms mean one and the same thing, "Today." He writes:

That 'One Day,' and 'Formerly,' future and past, are like 'Today.'<sup>57</sup>

And he posits further in saying that:

And the present is like the past and the future. All three phases of time merge as one, as the selfsame, into a single present, and eternal Now.<sup>58</sup>

In Heidegger's analysis, "Nietzsche, too, conceives of the three phases of time from the standpoint of eternity as a permanent Now."<sup>59</sup> But Heidegger swiftly reminds us that Nietzsche's notion of permanence "...does not consist in something static, but in the recurrence of the same."<sup>60</sup>

Nietzsche, as Heidegger opines, takes Eternal Recurrence as:

...the inexhaustible fullness of joyful-painful life. That is the point of the 'great longing' of the teacher of the Eternal Recurrence of the same.<sup>61</sup>

And so, Heidegger raises this question: What bridge allows him to cross over to the Superhuman, and in that crossing allows him to take leave of man as he is until now, so that he frees himself from him? Heidegger finds Nietzsche's answer to this question so strange and puzzling as if Heidegger is indirectly telling us that he finds Nietzsche so strange and puzzling as a thinker. But Heidegger is kind enough not to label Nietzsche as a morbid and eccentric sort of thinker.

So what is Nietzsche's reply to the aforementioned question? Nietzsche, as quoted by Heidegger, asserts:

For that man delivered from revenge, that is, the bridge to the highest hope for me, and a rainbow after long storms.<sup>62</sup>

But what does Nietzsche mean by revenge and deliverance from it (revenge)? To shed light relative to the answer of the question, Heidegger quotes Nietzsche of saying:

The spirit of revenge, my friends, has so far been the subject of man's best reflection; and wherever there was suffering, their punishment was also wanted.<sup>63</sup>

In the above quotation, Heidegger elucidates that the term reflection "...means not just any pondering, but that thinking in which man's relation to what is, to all beings, is grounded and attuned. Over and above this Nietzsche point-of-view of thinking, Heidegger readily shares his own way of giving the meaning of thinking. Writes Heidegger.

Insofar as man is related to beings, he represents being with reference to the fact that it is, what and how it is, how it might be and ought to be; in short, he represents being with reference to its Being. This representation is thinking.<sup>64</sup>

And it is in the realm of representation where Heidegger sees Nietzsche's contention on the spirit of revenge lies.<sup>65</sup> Here, Heidegger grabs the opportunity to explicate his thoughts on the relationship of Being to being. He argues:

In whatever manner man may represent beings as such to himself, he represents them in view of their Being. Because of this, man always goes beyond beings and chooses over to Being.<sup>66</sup>

In the argument that pertains to man's act of crossing over from being to Being, or in every man's relationship to being. Now, in the dimension of metaphysics in relation Nietzsche's view of revenge, Heidegger remarks:

In understanding revenge as the spirit that attunes and determines man/s relation to beings, Nietzsche conceives revenge metaphysically from the start.<sup>67</sup>

To Heidegger, indeed, Nietzsche views revenge from the standpoint of metaphysics. This is why Heidegger warns that one should not take Nietzsche's concept of revenge in the auspices of morality or psychology.<sup>68</sup> So: "How does Nietzsche conceive the nature of revenge assuming he (Nietzsche) thinks of it metaphorically?"<sup>69</sup> asks Heidegger. And in Heidegger's quest to find Nietzsche's answer to this question, he opines:

In part II of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in the section 'On Deliverance,' Nietzsche has his Zarathustra say: 'This, yet this alone, is revenge itself: the will's aversion to time and its 'It was.'<sup>70</sup>

In analyzing Nietzsche's contention, Heidegger asserts that "... signifies the Being of beings as a whole, not only human willing."<sup>71</sup>

By characterizing revenge as the 'will's aversion,' it retains its resistant persecution from the outset within the region of the Being of beings.... Revenge is 'the will's aversion to time and its 'It was.'<sup>72</sup>

In Nietzsche's interpretation and understanding regarding Nietzsche's concept of "spirit of revenge" in relation to time, Heidegger remarks that "...when Nietzsche places great stress on time's 'it was.' He obviously does not intent his characterization of the nature of revenge to refer to 'the' time as such, but to a particular aspect of time."<sup>73</sup>

However inasmuch as time is contained not only in the "it was," but also in the "it will be" and "it is now," Heidegger cautiously reminds his readers that Nietzsche's definition of revenge and the will's aversion to time and its "it was" means that such spirit of revenge "...identifies the foundation of time in its entire and intrinsic time essence."<sup>74</sup> But why is it that Nietzsche conceives the idea of revenge as the will's aversion to time? What is in time that the will should gather its strength, for it have aversion or persecution<sup>75</sup> to it?

In Heidegger's analysis. Nietzsche is a profound thinker who hates time because of its transience nature. And since time is transient, the will refuses to hold control over it no matter how it unceasingly pursues it. In effect, time paralyzes the will. Time keeps the will not to earn any inch of movement. Consequently, time succeeds in spawning havoc to the will by making it suffer. The will suffers because its movement is punctured by time. Writes Heidegger:

Revenge is the will's aversion to time, and that means the ceasing to be, its transience. The will no longer has any influence over it, and its willing constantly runs up against it. Time and its 'it was' is the stumbling block that the will cannot budge. Time and its 'it was' is the adversity that the will suffers. As a suffering will, it suffers transience wills its own cessation as suffering and thereby will the disappearance of all things.<sup>76</sup>

Thus, only by having aversion to time can the will affords to throw an opprobrium to it and in the end the will enables itself to degrade the nature of time as transient.

Says Heidegger:

For Nietzsche, the most profound revenge consists of that reflection which posits eternal ideals as the absolute, compared with which the temporal must degrade itself to actual non-being.<sup>77</sup>

For Heidegger, "Nietzsche is the first thinker who, in view of a world history emerging for the first time, asks the decisive question and thinks through its metaphorical implication. The question is: Is man, as man in his nature till now, prepared to assume dominion over the whole earth? If not, what must happen to man as he is so that he may be able to 'subject the earth and thereby fulfill the word of an old testament?'"<sup>78</sup> Yes, Nietzsche believes that man is

not a finished product. Nietzsche it appears, shouts to the top of his voice the dictum: It is not enough to be human!" Nietzsche wants to push man to realize his capabilities. In effect, Nietzsche is so convinced that only when man becomes the Superman can he vests himself with the right to be the steward of creation, in Heidegger's own words, "guardianship of Being."

The surest way then through which man can succeed in reaping dominion over the whole earth is to vanish and dissect into its last bone the spirit of revenge. Here, Heidegger posits his contention:

How is man to assume dominion over the earth, how is he to take the earth, as earth into his guardianship, if as long as he degrades the earthy<sup>79</sup> as earth is at stake, then the spirit of revenge must first vanish. That is why deliverance from the spirit of revenge is the bridge to the highest hope for Zarathustra.<sup>80</sup>

In the light of Heidegger's understanding, Nietzsche, indeed, was determined to liberate the will from its rapacious efforts to have aversion to time, to the transient. Thus, to "...Nietzsche, deliverance from revenge is indeed deliverance from what is repugnant, resistant, and degrading the will, but not a release from all willing."<sup>81</sup> Thus, only when the will positions itself to embrace time, and in the end, affirms the transience can the will breathe the air of deliverance from its aversion to time. But how is this made possible?

As the will affirms time, as the will enunciates its fiat to time, it enables itself to abide by the transience. But it accepts, endures, or submits itself to the transience, to time itself, "... it does not just constantly pass, but always comes to be."<sup>82</sup> To reinforce this claim, Heidegger says:

It would abide only in such a way that transience and what ceases to be return as the selfsame in its coming. But this recurrence itself is abiding only if it is eternal.<sup>83</sup>

Now, how Nietzsche's Superman related to such deliverance from revenge? In Heidegger's analysis:

Deliverance from revenge is the bridge from contempt for time, to the will that represents beings in the Eternal Recurrence of the same, in which the will becomes the advocates of the circle.<sup>84</sup>

Heidegger asserts further:

...only when the Being of beings<sup>85</sup> is represented to man as the Eternal Recurrence of the same, only then can man cross the bridge and, crossing over, be delivered from the spirit of revenge, be the Superman.<sup>86</sup>

## CONCLUSION

So, who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? Heidegger sketches his analysis of Nietzsche's Zarathustra as follows: Zarathustra is the speaker, the advocate, the convalescent or the teacher who is never exhausted of preaching his doctrine on the Superman. He preaches on the Superman "...solely because he is the teacher of the Eternal Recurrence of the same."<sup>87</sup> As he teaches on his doctrine on Eternal Recurrence, he liberates man from the "...[previous reflection from the spirit of revenge unto a yes, a fiat to the Eternal Recurrence of the same."<sup>88</sup> He maintains his conviction that the doctrines on the Eternal Recurrence and the Superman are correlative, i.e., one cannot stand on its own without the other. Thus: "Zarathustra teaches the Superman because he is the teacher of the Eternal Recurrence. But conversely as well, Zarathustra teaches the Eternal Recurrence because he is the teacher of the Superman."<sup>89</sup> But Nietzsche made it a point that his Zarathustra is a visionary. Thus, "...the teacher (Zarathustra) knows that what he teaches remains a vision and an enigma. (And) in this reflective knowledge he abides."<sup>90</sup>

Inasmuch as Zarathustra's doctrine on the Eternal Recurrence of the same and the Superman "...remains a vision for him and also an enigma, it can neither be verified nor refuted logically or empirically."<sup>91</sup> Zarathustra's doctrine on the Eternal Recurrence of the same and the Superman "...belong together in a circle. By its circling, the doctrine accords with what is, with the circle that constitutes the Being of beings – that is the permanent within Becoming."<sup>92</sup> These doctrines i.e., the Eternal Recurrence of the Same and the Superman, embrace the circle "...when they cross the bridge that is called deliverance from the spirit of revenge. Through it, all previous thought is to be overcome."<sup>93</sup> Heidegger asserts that the "belonging-together" of the Eternal Recurrence of the same and the Superman gives us a room to believe that "...Zarathustra himself is this belonging-together. From the perspective, he, too, remains an enigma that we still hardly caught sight of."<sup>94</sup> To Heidegger, "Eternal Recurrence of the same" is the name of the Being of beings" (or "willing"). 'Superman' is the name of the human being who corresponds to this Being."<sup>95</sup>

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*. (Cambridge: Penguin Classics, 1991), p.39.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p.41.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p.53.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p.69.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p.69.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p.76.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p.77.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p.80.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p.83.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p.97.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp.97-98.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p.98.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.,p.99.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p.100.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p.100-101.

<sup>23</sup> Walter Kaufmann. Translator's Preface. In: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. (New York:Random House, Inc. 1995), p.xix).

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p.xxii.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p.xxiv.

<sup>26</sup> Michael Tanner. "Introduction." In: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, op.cit.,p.vii.

<sup>27</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" In: *The New Nietzsche*. David B. Alison, editor. (England: The MIT Press, 1992), p.64.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> See, Ibid., pp.64-65.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p.65.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p.65.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., pp.65-66.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p.66.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> See, Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p.68.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p.67.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p.68.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> See, Ibid., pp.68-69. Here, Heidegger has a very notable observation. He argues: "In "On the Great Longing," Zarathustra is conversing with his soul. According to Plato's doctrine, which became decisive for Western metaphysics, the essence of thought resides in the soul's conservation, with itself...the self-gathering in conservation, which the soul undergoes on its way to itself...the self-gathering in conversation, which the soul undergoes on its way to itself in the surroundings of whatever it perceives." See, Ibid. If this is the case, it appears then that it is not really categorically true that Nietzsche abhors Platonic thought inasmuch as he has also treaded the path carved by Plato.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p.69.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid. Here, Heidegger opines: Metaphysics call the permanent Now 'eternity.' See, *ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p.70.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> See, *ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.70-71.

<sup>68</sup> See, *ibid.*, p.71.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p.72.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p.73.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.* In his own anatomy of the meaning of revenge, Heidegger writes the following lines: "if for the moment we stay close to the literal meaning of the word...we shall find a hint. 'Rache' to wreak vengeance, 'wreken', 'urgere', all signify 'to press close' or 'hard', 'drive'. 'drive out', 'banish', 'pursue'." See, *ibid.*,p.72

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p.67.

<sup>79</sup> Heidegger holds that: "The aversion to time degrades the transient. The earthly, the earth and all that is part of it, really should not be, and , at bottom devoid of true being. Plato had already called it meon, non-being." See, *ibid.*,p.73

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p.73.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p.74.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> To Heidegger, "Being of beings" refers to the will as it wills. He writes: 'The word 'willing' here signifies the Being of beings as a whole. It is will.: See, *ibid.*, p.71.

<sup>86</sup> *Loc.cit.*

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p.74.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p.75.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.* Heidegger related Nietzsche's concept of the Eternal Recurrence of the same and the Superman to Nietzsche's animals. Heidegger says: "...let us observe the view on his animals that appear to him at the beginning of his journey: "...then he looked into the air inquiringly, for overhead he heard the shrill call of a bird: And behold an eagle soared through the air in wide circles and on him there hung a snake, not like a prey, but like a friend: for she kept herself wound around his neck. "They are my animals said Zarathustra and rejoiced." See, *ibid.*, p.75. Thus , "The enigma – who Zarathustra is as a teacher of Eternal Recurrence and the Superman – becomes a vision to us at the sight of the two animals." See, *ibid.*, p.78.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, p.75.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p.77.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

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